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at their regularly scheduled meetings or in confer-
ence calls. One often-neglected consequence of
quarterly averaging is that any change in the target
federal funds rate will affect the quarterly average in
two different quarters. For example, if policymakers
raise the target by 50 basis points precisely halfway
through this quarter, then the current quarter’s aver-
age will rise by 25 basis points relative to last quarter,
and next quarter’s average will also exceed this quar-
ter’s average by 25 basis points, all else equal. Note
that this calculation relies on a key feature of target
changes: They are in effect until further notice and
not for a specified time period. In other words, mone-
tary policymakers could announce a 25-basis-point
increase in the target federal funds rate that would
be in effect for the next 60 days, but this is not what
they do. Instead, each target change is in effect until
further notice. Hence, a target change made now is
likely to persist into the following quarter.
Despite this clear source of predictable change
in the quarterly average of the federal funds rate,
the vast bulk of the literature that estimates policy
equations ignores information concerning the tim-
ing and magnitude of discrete changes to the target
federal funds rate. As a result, such empirical models
end up trying to predict the effect on the monthly
or quarterly average of known, past policy actions
rather than include this piece of data in the forecast
information set. While this information about dis-
crete target changes might seem like a second-order
issue in the estimation of policy equations, we
present estimates of a Taylor-type policy equation
(Taylor, 1993) that suggest otherwise. It turns out
that policy equations of the quarterly average of
the federal funds rate that take account of discrete
changes to the target federal funds rate fit the data
substantially better than those that omit this infor-
mation. In addition, we show that empirical results
on important policy questions can be overturned,
depending on whether a discreteness-adjustment
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I
n macroeconomic models with monthly or
quarterly data, it is common to assume that
variables—such as output, investment, and
inflation—respond to the monthly or quarterly
average of the daily federal funds rate. The idea is
that the cumulative flow of investment spending
within a quarter, for example, does not depend on
the value of the federal funds rate at a point in time
but, instead, on its average level throughout the
quarter. In fact, the use of the monthly or quarterly
average of the federal funds rate is common practice
in a variety of empirical macroeconomic models,
from vector autoregressions (e.g., Bernanke and
Blinder, 1992) to estimated versions of stochastic
dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g., Lubik
and Schorfheide, 2004). In addition, the daily effec-
tive federal funds rate contains noise in the form
of departures from the target level set by monetary
policymakers, as a result of idiosyncratic conditions
in the interbank loan market on a given day. Aver-
aging the daily rates across a month or quarter is
one way to cancel most of this noise—and is yet
another reason why the use of monthly and quar-
terly averages has become a widely used measure
of monetary policy. Hence, regardless of the direc-
tion of the evolution of empirical macroeconomics,
the use of the monthly or quarterly average of the
daily federal funds rate will likely remain common
practice.
Another feature common to otherwise disparate
approaches to macroeconomic modeling is that the
federal funds rate has its own equation called the
policy equation. Because Federal Reserve policy-
makers use the federal funds rate as their policy
instrument, one equation in the model describes
the way that policymakers adjust the policy instru-
ment in response to the current state of the economy.
In practice, monetary policymakers adjust a target
level for the federal funds rate by discrete increments
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term is included in the estimation of a policy equa-
tion. In particular, we focus in this paper on a debate
concerning the source of interest rate smoothing—
an issue discussed in greater detail in the next sec-
tion. Given the results in this paper, we recommend
that such a discreteness-adjustment term be included
as a regular feature of empirical models of the quar-
terly or monthly average of the federal funds rate.
THE DEBATE ON INTEREST RATE
SMOOTHING IN ESTIMATED POLICY
EQUATIONS
One lively debate in empirical macroeconomics
is whether monetary policymakers adjust the federal
funds rate gradually in response to developments
in the economy or, alternatively, whether the deter-
minants of the interest rate evolve gradually enough
to account for the sluggish pace of observed changes
in the interest rate. Sack (2000) and Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (2000) argue for the former; Rudebusch
(2002) argues for the latter; English, Nelson, and
Sack (2003) find evidence of both. This question can
be summarized as follows: Do policymakers smooth
the interest rate by overtly choosing to adjust it
gradually? Three reasons have been put forth for
rate smoothing and partial adjustment. First, policy-
makers are uncertain about the true structure of the
economy and this source of possible policy mistakes
leads them to act less forcefully in the short run
(Sack, 2000). Second, and similarly, policymakers
are uncertain about the accuracy of initial data
releases—another source of possible policy mistakes
(Orphanides, 2001). Third, and perhaps most rele-
vant, is the idea from Woodford (2003) that monetary
policymakers can influence market expectations if
they show a willingness to implement—even through
gradual actions—a large long-run interest rate
response if necessary. For example, suppose that
policymakers indicate that they are willing to raise
the federal funds rate by an eventual amount of 120
basis points if a 40-basis-point increase in inflation
persists. Policymakers demonstrate this willingness
by embarking on a path of raising the interest rate
gradually. If the public believes that this gradual
path will be implemented for as long as necessary
to reduce inflation, market expectations will adjust
quickly, with the beneficial effect of reducing infla-
tion without requiring much actual increase in the
interest rate.
A dissenting voice to the interest rate smoothing
argument is Rudebusch (2002), who suggests that
episode-specific factors influence the setting of
monetary policy and are not captured by simple
empirical policy equations. For example, the credit
crunch in the early 1990s, the financial market upset
in 1998, and the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, all created uncertainties that had a persistent
influence on the level of the federal funds rate, yet
they are not incorporated in simple policy equations.
Rudebusch suggests that purported evidence of
interest rate smoothing is actually only a product
of omitted variable bias. Since it is not really possible
to include or even measure all of the relevant vari-
ables in an interest rate regression, Rudebusch (2002)
concludes that the lagged policy rate (a measure of
interest rate smoothing) can be included in regres-
sions but should not be interpreted as a structural
feature of monetary policy practice.
To disentangle these two competing hypotheses,
English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) studied a specifica-
tion for a policy rule that can nest these two inter-
pretations of Federal Reserve policy. Their results
suggest a significant role for both interpretations,
although their analysis indicated that interest rate
smoothing was perhaps the most important factor
quantitatively. In this article, we demonstrate that
empirical tests concerning this debate can be over-
turned if the effects of discrete target changes are
taken into account. The next section describes such
a discreteness adjustment.
DISCRETE TARGET CHANGES AND
FORECASTS OF THE QUARTERLY
AVERAGE
The discreteness adjustment is the one used in
Dueker (2002) and assumes that any target change
made to the federal funds rate during the quarter is
likely to remain in force through the next quarter.
In this case, the starting point for this quarter’s funds
rate is not the previous quarter’s average but the
target rate that held at the end of the previous quarter.
Another way to look at this issue is to note that, if a
quarter has N business days and a 50-basis-point
increase in the target federal funds rate occurs after
Nj business days have elapsed in the quarter, then,
other things equal, the effect of such a target change
on the next quarter’s average, relative to this quarter’s
average, would be to increase it by Nj/N × 50 basis
points above this quarter’s average, it. If more than
one discrete change takes place within a quarter,
then the effect of the target changes on the quarterly
average would be
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(1) ,
where the discrete target changes are denoted ∆i
T
and DDV is the discreteness variable first used in
Dueker (2002). An equivalent way to present this
discreteness adjustment is that it serves as a link
between last quarter’s average and the target rate
at the end of the quarter:
(2)
where i
T is the end-of-period value of the target
federal funds rate and i is the quarterly average. 
Figure 1 plots the target federal funds rate along
with the quarterly average of the federal funds rate.
In the chart, one can see that target changes can
precede some upward and downward shifts in the
quarterly average. Figure 2 makes this pattern even
more apparent: It plots the changes in the quarterly
average, it – it–1, with the discreteness adjustment,
DDVt–1=i
T
t–1 – it–1. It is clear from the close corre-
spondence in Figure 2 that DDVt–1 will be a relatively
powerful predictor of changes in the quarterly
average of the federal funds rate, based on target
changes that took place in the previous quarter.
Indeed this conjecture proves to be the case in the
empirical results presented in the next section.
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR LINEAR
TAYLOR RULES WITH RATE SMOOTHING
English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) observed that
the hypotheses of interest rate smoothing and per-
sistent omitted factors can be nested in one specifi-
cation of a policy equation. Using their notation,
let i, π, and y denote, respectively, the interest rate,
the inflation rate, and the output gap. As discussed
above, the interest rate used as the monetary policy
instrument is the quarterly average of the federal
funds rate; the inflation rate is the most recent four-
quarter change in the chain-weighted personal
consumption expenditures price index; the output
gap is the percentage difference between chain-
weighted real gross domestic product (GDP) and
the potential GDP measure from the Congressional
Budget Office. The sample period is from 1984:Q2
to 2004:Q2 and coincides with the period for which
a well-accepted series for the target federal funds
rate exists.
For this illustration of the effects of discrete target
changes on the quarterly average of the federal funds
rate, the basic policy equation is a contemporaneous
iD D Vi tt t
T
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Taylor rule, whereby monetary policy responds to
the current values of the inflation rate and the out-
put gap. (Alternative forward-looking Taylor rules
can make use of measures of expected inflation.)
With the two behavioral assumptions appended,
the following three equations describe the policy




where iˆ represents the Taylor rule–implied level of
the federal funds rate in the absence of interest rate
smoothing and policy concerns other than inflation
and the output gap; λ is the interest rate smoothing
parameter under the assumption that the rate policy-
makers inherit from the past is it–1 (which we can
also call the reference rate for the purposes of
interest rate smoothing); and ρ measures the persist-
ence of omitted factors that also concern monetary
policymakers. For the side of the debate that believes
that monetary policymakers smooth interest rates
purposefully, λ would account for the gradual adjust-
ment of the federal funds rate and ρ would be zero.
For the opposite side of the debate, λ would be zero
and the gradual adjustment would be explained by
errors due to omitted ancillary policy concerns, such
as financial market disturbances, in the form of
autoregressive model errors. 
The purpose of the interest rate smoothing
equation is to assume that monetary policymakers
set the rate this period equal to a weighted average
of the rate implied by the Taylor rule and the rate
inherited from the previous quarter. Following the
previous period’s target changes, however, the rate
inherited from the past ought to be the end-of-period
target level, i
T
t–1, and not it–1, the previous quarter’s
average. But this hypothesis is testable, as we can
nest the two specifications as follows.
With discreteness adjustment, the expression
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where the rate inherited from the previous quarter
is the end-of-period target level, i
T
t–1=it–1+DDVt–1,
if δ=0 and it equals the previous quarter’s average
if δ=–λ.
English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) combine the
three expressions from equation (3) into one equation
that describes the changes in the federal funds rate:
(5)
where iˆis the Taylor rule–implied level of the federal
funds rate absent any interest rate smoothing or
autoregressive errors due to ancillary policy concerns. 
With the discreteness adjustment, the com-
bined expression is as follows: 
(6)
.
A key feature of the specification in equations (5)
and (6) is that it does not impose either hypothesis
(λ=0 or ρ=0). Judd and Rudebusch (1998) called
∆it–1 a term that captured “momentum” from the
previous period’s funds rate change. The purpose of
the discreteness adjustment, however, is to provide
an accurate reflection of the momentum implied
by the previous period’s discrete target changes,
which frees ∆it–1 from having to play this role.
Nonlinear least-squares estimates for equation
(5) are shown in the first column of Table 2. The
results without the discreteness adjustment, DDV,
concur with English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) in that
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both λ and ρ are significantly greater than zero, and
the Taylor rule still seems operative, given significant
coefficients on bπ and by. A well-known stability
property of Taylor rules is that the coefficient on
inflation must be greater than 1 and the estimate of
bπ=1.25 from equation (5) meets this criterion even
if its standard error is 0.50. In most cases, the analysis
often stops at this point, with a standard error of the
regression of 33 basis points per quarter. 
Our discussion of the discreteness adjustment
leads us to believe, however, that these results might
change if the empirical model incorporated infor-
mation regarding target changes in the previous
quarter. Equation (4) suggests that when δ=0, the
starting point for interest rate smoothing is the end-
of-period target rate, rather than the most recent
quarterly average. If it is the quarterly average, on
the other hand, then a value of δ=–λ would remove
the discreteness adjustment, DDV, from equations
(4) and (6). The second column of Table 2 shows
estimates of equation (6) with an estimate of δ. Put
in the context of equation (2), this value of δ implies
that the reference rate for interest smoothing is
it–1+1.24(i
T
t–1– it–1).This coefficient is very close to
the value of 1.21 that Dueker (2002) found on the
same discreteness-adjustment variable in a vector
autoregression. In both cases, however, the coeffi-
cient δ is not significantly different from zero, which
suggests that the reference rate for interest rate
smoothing is the end-of-period target rate, i
T
t–1, and
not the most recent quarterly average, tt–1. Accord-
ingly, the last column in Table 2 shows the estimates
for equation (6) with δ set to zero and finds that
the standard error of the regression is essentially
unchanged from when δ=0.24 (middle column of
Calculation of the Discreteness Adjustment
Discreteness adjustment
Days in quarter Days within quarter when target changed for following quarter
1990:Q4 66 12 33 50 58
Rate change –0.25 –0.25 –0.25 –0.25
(20/66)*(–0.25) + (32/66)*(–0.25) + (49/66)*(–0.25) + (57/66)*(–0.25) = –0.5985
1994:Q2 65 12 33
Rate change 0.25 0.50 — —
(11/65)*(0.25) + (32/65)*(0.50) = 0.2885
2001:Q1 65 3 23 57
Rate change –0.50 –0.50 –0.50 —
(2/65)*(–0.50) + (22/65)*(–0.50) + (56/65)*(–0.50) = –0.6154
Table 1
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Table 2). In contrast, the standard error of the regres-
sion in Table 2 is 21 percent higher when the discrete-
ness adjustment is omitted. Based on this estimate,
we set δ=0 in all subsequent model specifications.
In terms of Taylor rule coefficients, interest rate
smoothing parameters, and autoregressive errors, the
estimates with and without the discreteness adjust-
ment are also different. The point estimates of the
inflation and output gap response coefficients are
higher with the discreteness adjustment, although
their standard errors are relatively large. In the last
column of Table 2, the estimated values of bπ and
by are 1.85 and 1.07, respectively. In addition, the
estimated value of λ goes up and ρ goes down with
the discreteness adjustment. Instead of being roughly
equal at about 0.75 without the discreteness adjust-
ment, λ=0.92 and ρ=0.44 with the discreteness
adjustment (last column of Table 2).
Two caveats, however, hinder us from interpreting
λ=0.92 as direct evidence of interest rate smoothing.
First, this estimate covers all quarters and thereby
mixes the roughly 40 percent of all quarters when
the target federal funds rate did not change with the
60 percent when the target did change. Second, we
need to consider the fact that monetary policymakers
would not move the target funds rate to the Taylor
rule–implied level at the beginning of each quarter;
instead they could act slowly but, by the end of the
period, set the target rate, i
T, equal to the Taylor rate,
iˆ. As an extreme example, suppose that the target
is always unchanged until two-thirds of the way
through each quarter, whereupon it is set equal to
the Taylor rate, iˆ. This timing alone would result in
a value of λ=0.66 to match the quarterly average:
.




t show persistence beyond any found in




t, however, we would like the estimate of iˆ t
to come from a model that recognizes that policy-
makers do not change the target funds rate every
quarter and, hence, the standard deviation of the
residual, denoted σ, will sometimes be much lower
than the 28 basis points shown in Table 2.
One way to separate the target change/no target
change regimes in a predictive model is to make λ
and the standard deviation, σ, subject to regime
switching. We explore such a nonlinear Taylor rule
model of monetary policy in the next section.  
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR
NONLINEAR TAYLOR RULES WITH
RATE SMOOTHING
A clean test for interest rate smoothing—in the
form of persistence in the gap between the Taylor
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Taylor Rule Policy Equations with and without Discreteness Adjustment, 1984:Q2–2004:Q2
Variable Coefficient No discreteness Discreteness
Intercept b0 2.28 1.12  1.24 
(1.24) (2.42) (1.85)
Inflation bπ 1.248 1.971  1.846 
(0.498) (0.937) (0.706)
Output gap by 0.853 0.948  1.073 
(0.354) (0.610) (0.486)
Rate smoothing λ 0.719 0.951  0.919 
(0.108) (0.035) (0.041)
Autoregressive errors ρ 0.769 0.281  0.438 
(0.134) (0.144) (0.118)
Inherited rate δ — 0.241 —
(0.182)
S.E.E.  σ 0.333 0.275  0.275 
R
–2 0.502 0.660 0.660
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2
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use an estimate of the Taylor rule rate from a model
that had two key attributes: First, the model would
not use data from quarters when policymakers did
not change the target federal funds rate to estimate
Taylor rule coefficients; second, the model would
not have autocorrelated errors. The first attribute is
important because we want a model that fits the
data in quarters where the target does not change
with the common-sense specification, ∆it=DDVt–1=
i
T
t–1– it–1, which requires in equation (6) that λ=1,
ρ=0, and δ=0 for those non-target-change obser-
vations. If the second attribute, ρ=0, holds for all
observations, then the end-of-period target ought
to equal the Taylor rule rate under the hypothesis
of no rate smoothing.
To find a model specification that has these two
desirable attributes, we introduce Markov switching
to two of the model parameters, λ and b0, the Taylor
rule intercept. The intent is to allow complete
smoothing (λ1<1) in one of the states, which ought
to coincide fairly well with the periods when the
target does not change. The value of λ in the other
state, λ2, could take on a lower value. The objective
behind regime switching in the Taylor rule intercept,
b0, is to lower or eliminate autocorrelation in the
model errors. In a Taylor rule, the intercept b0=r*–
(1 – bπ)π*, where r* is the equilibrium short-term
real interest rate and π* is the inflation target. Because
temporary changes in some combination of r* and
π* could occur across the business cycle or in periods
Markov-Switching Model with Switching in Taylor Rule Intercept and Smoothing,
1984:Q2–2004:Q2
Variable Coefficient No discreteness Discreteness
Intercepts b0, S1= 1 –0.898 0.581
(0.819) (0.421)
b0, S1= 2 2.48 4.35
(0.657) (0.480)
Inflation bπ 1.927 1.721
(0.239) (0.167)
Output gap by 0.969 1.11
(0.164) (0.094)
Rate smoothing λ S2= 1 1.0 0.980
(0.003)
Rate smoothing λ S2= 2 0.717 0.888
(0.045) (0.033)
Autoregressive errors ρ 0.280 0.00
(0.030) (0.012)
Transition probabilities p1 0.955 0.947
(0.034) (0.043)
Transition probabilities q1 0.951 0.943
(0.038) (0.049)
Transition probabilities p2 0.473 0.636
(0.137) (0.122)
Transition probabilities q2 0.711 0.763
(0.087) (0.077)
S.E.E. σS2= 1 0.057 0.014
(0.010) (0.004)
S.E.E. σS2= 2 0.271 0.303
(0.030) (0.042) 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3
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of financial market upset, it seems natural to investi-
gate whether variation in b0 could remove some or
all of the autocorrelation in the errors.
We allow the regime switching in these two
parameters to take place independently through
two separate state variables, S1 and S2. Thus, the
Taylor rule rate with regime switching is
(7) ,    Taylor rule
where S1t=1,2 is an unobserved state variable and
the transition probabilities are denoted
p1=Pr(S1t=1|S1t–1=1) and q1=Pr(S1t=2|S1t–1=2).
The rate-smoothing equation with regime
switching is
(8) ,
where we also allow the variance to depend on the
state variable because we expect much lower vari-
ance in the state where λ<1. For the second state
variable, S2, we report parameter estimates for both
fixed transition probabilities and time-varying transi-
tion probabilities. The fixed transition probabilities
are denoted p2=Pr(S2t=1|S2t–1=1) and
q2=Pr(S2t=2|S2t–1=2).
Parameter estimates for the model with fixed
ii i D D V e tS t S t t S t tt t =− + + + −− ()( ) 1 22 1 1 2 λλ σ ˆ
ˆ i bbb y tS t y t t =++ 01 , ππ
transition probabilities are in Table 3. Figure 3 shows
the smoothed probability of the low Taylor rule
intercept (S1=1) from the model with the discrete-
ness adjustment. The periods when the Taylor rule
intercept is low coincide roughly with periods when
interest rates experience cyclical fluctuations around
recessions, which are shaded in the chart. Impor-
tantly, the model with the discreteness adjustment
is able to separate periods when the target changed
from periods when it did not, because the variance
parameters are farther apart for that model. The
model with the discreteness adjustment is also able
to eliminate the autocorrelation in the errors, whereas
the model without the discreteness adjustment still
has significantly autocorrelated errors, with ρ=0.28.
Without constraining λ, it takes a value very close
to 1.0 when S2=1. Even when it equals 0.98 in the
model with the discreteness adjustment, the econ-
omic effect of this difference in terms of basis points
is negligible. In other words, the model imputes
essentially zero input from the Taylor rule rate when
λ=0.98.
Figure 4 shows how well the smoothed probabil-
ity of S2=1 matches periods when the target federal
funds rate did not change for the model with the
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from Table 3. The correspondence is quite close,
suggesting that the Taylor response coefficients are
not attempting to explain much about the quarters
when policymakers left the target rate unchanged,
because λ is very close to 1.0 in that state.
Despite these apparently strong results, constant
transition probabilities are not completely satisfac-
tory for switching in the parameter λ. We would
expect that policymakers would respond systemati-
cally to economic developments when deciding in
which periods to leave the target unchanged and set
λ to 1. In reality, these no-change periods have an
endogenous component and are not solely the result
of coin flips. One natural variable to use to predict




the gap between the Taylor rule rate and the most
recent end-of-period target federal funds rate. If the
size of this gap is large in absolute value, then we
would expect that a target change and the regime
where λ<1 are more likely. With this explanatory
variable, we parameterize the time-varying transition
probabilities for S2 as
(9)
.
Because S2=1 is the state where λ<1 and the tar-
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get is less likely to change, we would expect to find
c1<0 and d1>0. These signs would mean that mone-
tary policymakers are more likely to accept feedback
from the Taylor rule rate when the gap between





Parameter estimates for the Markov-switching
model with time-varying transition probabilities are
in Table 4. The estimates are relatively unchanged
from Table 3. The only significant coefficient on Zt
is c1<0 in the model without the discreteness adjust-




large, then policymakers are likely to switch out of
the state where λ<1 if they had been in that state.
In the model with the discreteness adjustment, d1
has a point estimate above zero, as expected, but it
is not statistically significant. Thus, although we have
presented a framework for predicting when mone-
tary policymakers are likely to keep the federal funds
target unchanged, we have not yet identified a sig-
nificant explanatory variable for the time-varying
transition probabilities. For this reason, we report
estimates from the fixed transition probability
model to examine persistence in the gap between
the Taylor rule rate and the end-of-period federal
funds target rate, iˆ
t– i
T
t. Because these regimes are
endogenous, further research on the process govern-
ing target rate changes is needed. In this vein,
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Hamilton and Jorda (2002) present an autoregres-
sive conditional hazard model of the target federal
funds rate. Similarly, a dynamic ordered probit
model, of the type that Dueker (1999) estimated,
of changes in the bank prime rate could be applied
to target changes.
A MEASURE OF INTEREST RATE
SMOOTHING
As discussed above, only models in which the
errors are not autocorrelated, ρ=0, imply that the
end-of-period target ought to equal the Taylor rule
rate under the hypothesis of no rate smoothing. A
comparison of Tables 2, 3, and 4 shows that only the
Markov-switching models with the discreteness
adjustment eliminate the autocorrelation in the
model errors. Consequently, a direct measure of the




t from these two models.
However, because the value of the likelihood
function barely changes between Tables 3 and 4
for the model with the discreteness adjustment, we
Markov-Switching Model with Time-Varying Transition Probabilities on the Smoothing Parameter,
1984:Q2–2004:Q2
Variable Coefficient No discreteness Discreteness
Intercepts b0, S1= 1 –0.818 0.579
(1.17) (0.393)
b0, S1= 2 2.46 4.91
(0.488) (0.697)
Inflation bπ 1.877 1.728
(0.276) (0.161)
Output gap by 1.049 1.070
(0.244) (0.092)
Rate smoothing λ S2= 1 0.999 0.986
(0.008) (0.003)
Rate smoothing λ S2= 2 0.738 0.890
(0.070) (0.023)
Autoregressive errors ρ 0.294 0.006
(0.026) (0.010)
Transition probabilities p1 0.974 0.943
(0.023) (0.035)
Transition probabilities q1 0.933 0.835
(0.025) (0.107)
Transition probabilities c0 433.8 0.261
(75.7) (1.00)
Transition probabilities c1 –548.8 0.355
(145.6) (0.633)
Transition probabilities d0 1.11 0.427
(1.00) (0.819)
Transition probabilities d1 –0.26 1.236
(0.77) (1.144)
S.E.E. σ 0.195 0.245
(0.018) (0.070)
S.E.E. σS2= 1 0.052 0.267
(0.009) (0.029)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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concentrate on the results from Table 3, the speci-
fication with fixed transition probabilities. Figure 5
shows the Taylor rule rate implied by the Table 4
estimates with the end-of-period target. In general,
the Taylor rule rate leads the target when the target
rises and falls. It is remarkable, therefore, that the
target, on its descent between 2001 and 2003, did
not lag the Taylor rule rate. Monetary policymakers
apparently were not smoothing the interest rate as
the economy went into recession in 2001. Table 5’s
correlogram of the difference between the model-
implied Taylor rule rate and the target federal funds
rate shows that Federal Reserve policymakers close
the gap within about six quarters on average. Thus,
the degree of interest rate smoothing is considerable
but has a relatively short horizon.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article points out that discrete changes to
the target federal funds rate are a clear source of
predictable change in the monthly or quarterly
average of the daily federal funds rates. Figure 2
suggests that the adjustment for the discrete target
changes accounts for what is perhaps a surprising
amount of the sample variance of the changes in
the quarterly average. Thus, the discreteness adjust-
ment carries the potential to overturn estimation
results that involve the monthly or quarterly average
of the federal funds rate. We present such an example
by examining the debate concerning interest rate
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adjustment, estimation results suggest that interest
rate smoothing is not the only source of gradualism
in interest rate changes. With the discreteness
adjustment, however, the empirical results strongly
favor interest rate smoothing as the source of grad-
ualism in federal funds rate changes. We also show
that the discreteness adjustment affects empirical
results concerning the policy equations even in rela-
tively rich models that include regime switching.
The Markov-switching framework we present
is adept at separating the regime where policymakers
change the target from the regime where they do not.
This framework can employ explanatory variables
in the transition probabilities to predict these regimes
ahead of time. Future work can concentrate on study-
ing the determinants of the target change decisions
of policymakers.
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